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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code Ann.§ 
78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Osburn's arguments contain significant overlap and raise both legal and factual 
challenges to the district court's ruling. This Court "review[s] the district court's [factual] 
findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court 
some discretion in applying the law to the facts." Arnold v. Arnold, 2008 UT App 17, If 
5, 177 P.3d 89 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, in 
stalking cases, "the respondent's conduct must be considered cumulatively in light of all 
of the facts and circumstances of the case." Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, f^ 38, 136 
P.3dl242. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
The issuance of civil stalking injunctions is governed by Utah Code section 77-3a-
101. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 (2008). In order to issue a civil stalking 
injunction, the district court must find that the respondent has committed the offense of 
stalking the petitioner. See id. § 77-3a-101(5), (7). For purposes of the issuance of civil 
stalking injunctions, "'stalking' means the crime of stalking as defined in [Utah Code 
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s]ection 76-5-106.5." See id. § 77-3a-101(l). Utahfs stalking statute, Utah Code section 
76-5-106.5, provides: 
A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly 
engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person 
and knows or should know that the course of conduct would 
cause a reasonable person: 
(a)to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a 
third person; or 
(b)to suffer other emotional distress. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (2008). "Course of conduct" is defined as "two or more 
acts directed at or towards a specific person." See id. § 76-5-106.5(l)(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At trial, Bott testified that Osburn threatened to shoot her with a gun on December 7, 
2009 and again on December 13, 2009. After a hearing in which both Bott and Osburn each 
testified and called witnesses, the Court weighed the evidence presented and issued a permanent 
injunction. 
Osburn's primary defense at trial was that Bott had initiated the telephone calls in 
which the threats were made. At the close of testimony, Judge Hansen took a recess to 
determine whether the fact that Bott had made the phone calls to Osburn would serve as 
an affirmative defense for Osburn, and concluded that it would not. Trial Transcript at 
69-73. 
In his ruling, Judge Steven L. Hansen determined that Bott's testimony was more 
credible than Osburn's. Trial Transcript at 71-73. This entire case boils down to the 
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district court's evaluation of trial testimony. Osbum lost at trial, and is now attempting to 
have this Court rule that her testimony is more credible than Bott's. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's findings satisfy the statutory requirements for issuance of a civil 
stalking injunction: two or more acts, directed at Bott by Osburn, when she knew or 
should have known that such acts would reasonably cause Bott fear of harm or emotional 
distress. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5. The 
trial court found that on December 7, 2009, and again on December 13, 2009, Osburn 
threatened to shoot Bott. 
ARGUMENT 
Given the conflicting evidence presented to the district court, Osburn has not 
demonstrated that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. See generally Pitt v. Tar on, 
2009 UT App 113, f 2 n.l, 210 P.3d 962 ("As the trier of fact in a bench trial, the trial court is in 
the best position to weigh conflicting evidence and the credibility of witnesses." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); In re A. G., 2001 UT App 87,14, 27 P.3d 562 (upholding factual 
findings "unless they are clearly erroneous, meaning that they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
A. Emotional Distress 
Bott testified repeatedly that Osburn's threats to shoot her caused her emotional distress. 
In Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct.App.1997), the court clarified the definition 
of "emotional distress" for purposes of section 76-5-106.5. See id. at 1264. In Lopez, the 
defendant claimed that because section 76-5-106.5 did not contain a definition for emotional 
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distress, it was unconstitutionally vague. See id. The court rejected this claim, stating that "the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is well established in this state," and therefore 
"emotional distress is well defined in this state." Id. at 1264-65; see also State v. Martel, 273 
Mont. 143, 902 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1995) (holding that use of the phrase "substantial emotional 
distress" did not render the relevant statute unconstitutionally vague where that phrase was 
defmedby prior tort law); Woolfolkv. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 840, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533-36 
(1994) (using the phrase "emotional distress"). The Lopez court went on to state that 
"[e]motional distress results from conduct that is 'outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the 
generally accepted standards of decency and morality.'" Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1264 (quoting 
Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992)). Threatening to shoot 
someone two times within a week is both "outrageous" and "intolerable". 
The tort definition of emotional distress must be applied in the context of the other 
elements of a civil stalking claim. The stalking statute expressly incorporates the 
reasonable person standard, by defining stalking as "intentionally or knowingly 
engaging] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 
reasonable person ... to suffer emotional distress." Id. § 76-5-106.5(2)(a)(ii) (emphasis 
added). Given the fact that Osburn had already engaged in an extended sexual 
relationship with Bott's husband of 15 years and, in her opinion, destroyed her family 
consisting of five children, it was not unreasonable for the district court to conclude that 
two death threats would cause Bott to suffer emotion distress. 
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The legislature's use of the term "course of conduct," id., illustrates the essence of 
a stalking violation. Stalking, by its very nature, is an offense of repetition. The conduct 
is rendered more offensive and more threatening because it is repeated. 
The statute also requires the trier of fact to consider whether a reasonable person 
would have suffered emotional distress. See id. § 76-5-106.5(2)(a)(ii). The merging of the 
concepts of emotional distress and a reasonable reaction to it, is also present in this state's 
jurisprudence regarding tort claims based on emotional distress. In Lopez, this court 
stated that "[e]motional distress results from conduct that is 'outrageous and intolerable in 
that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.'" Salt Lake City 
v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (quoting Russell v. Thomson 
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992)). The consideration of whether 
someone has acted outrageously must be undertaken in light of all of the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case. 
In Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center, 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998), the 
Utah Supreme Court explained that "the emotional distress suffered must be severe; it 
must be such that a reasonable [person,] normally constituted, would be unable to 
adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Id. 
at 70 (addressing claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); see also Hansen v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply, 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 1993). 
A defendant's knowledge is also relevant to the question of whether the conduct is 
extreme and outrageous. The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise 
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from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, 
by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. In the instant case, the 
testimony showed that on December 13, 2009, Bott had dialed the number of her 
husband's cell phone ostensibly to speak to her husband. Trial Transcript at 7. On that 
occasion, Osburn knew that Bott had called her own husband, took the husband's phone 
and spoke to Bott, knew that Bott was aware that she was with Bott's husband, and then 
threatened to shoot Bott for a second time. Id. The conduct may become heartless, 
flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it 
would not be so if he did not know. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. f (1965). 
While the Restatement goes on to reiterate that the conduct must be objectively 
outrageous, it clearly recognizes that the character of the conduct should be considered in 
the context of the facts and circumstances of the individual case. See id. 
Both the plain language of the statute and accepted concepts of tort law reveal that 
the phrases "emotional distress" and "reasonable person" are not exclusive concepts, but 
must be considered together to evaluate whether a defendant has violated the civil 
stalking statute. 
B. Course of Conduct 
For a person to be guilty of stalking, she must, among other things, engage in a 
"course of conduct" that is "directed at a specific person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
106.5(2)(a). The definition of "course of conduct" includes "repeatedly conveying verbal 
10 
or written threats or threats implied by conduct. . . directed at or toward a person." Id. § 
76-5-106.5(l)(a) (emphasis added). And "repeatedly" is defined as "two or more 
occasions." Id. § 76-5-106.5(l)(c). Furthermore, subsection 2(a) incorporates a 
reasonable person standard in the stalking definition. See Ellison v. Stain, 2006 UT App 
150,^127, 136 P.3d 1242. Accordingly, a person is guilty of stalking as defined in section 
76-5-106.5(2)(a)(i)-(ii), if, on two or more occasions, she intentionally engages in 
conduct that causes a reasonable person to (1) fear bodily injury or (2) suffer emotional 
distress. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(l)-(2). After weighing all of the evidence, the 
district court concluded that these elements were satisfied by Osburn's threats to shoot 
Bott on December 7, 2009 and December 13, 2009. 
Osburn argues that the district court ruled against her because of her affair with 
Bott's husband. But the transcript reveals that the opposite is true. At the end of the trial, 
the district court stated on the record, "I'm not passing judgment on what's happened 
between you in your personal lives whatsoever. That's not before me today." Transcript 
at 71. Osburn's conduct, however, must be considered cumulatively in light of all of the 
facts and circumstances of the case. It would be inappropriate to consider each incident 
separately, without weighing the effect of the prior encounters between the parties. The 
failure to analyze the entire course of conduct between the parties is also inappropriate in 
determining whether Osburn's conduct was "directed at" Bott. Id. § 76-5-106.5(2)(a). 
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C. Osburn Has Failed To Marshall the Evidence. 
Osburn has failed to carry her heavy burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the 
trial court's ruling and showing that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
appellee, is insufficient. Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, f 7, 987 P.2d 588; accord Harding 
v. Bell, 2002 UT 108,119, 57 P.3d 1093; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Osburn's brief reads like a post-judgment motions to reconsider. See Ron 
Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n.4 (Utah 1994) ("[T]his court has 
consistently held that our rules of civil procedure do not provide for a motion for 
reconsideration of a trial court's order or j udgmen t . . . ."); Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not technically allow motions to reconsider); Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 
842-43 (Utah 1980). 
D. Weight of the Evidence. 
Osburn's chief complaint is that the district court did not believe her testimony. Trial 
courts are afforded broad discretion in deciding to admit or exclude evidence. See Jensen v. 
Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 1999). Appellate courts "presume that 
the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly shows to the 
contrary." State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Although decisions 
have varied, the standard of review for the admissibility of evidence is typically an abuse-of 
discretion. See, e.g., Stevenett, 977 P.2d at 511 (stating abuse of discretion as appropriate 
standard when rule of evidence requires trial court to balance factors). Abuse of discretion has 
been defined as acting beyond the bounds of reasonability. SeeAlonzo, 932 P.2d at 613. 
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Appellate courts review factual questions under the clearly erroneous standard, 
and legal questions under the correctness standard. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 
1244 (Utah 1998), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999). Although legal questions are 
reviewed for correctness, appellate courts "may still grant a trial court discretion in its 
application of the law to a given fact situation." Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244. This is the 
"mixed question" category. 
"Factual questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as 
things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the 
subjective, such as state of mind." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). A trial 
court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Pennington v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998). This comes from Rule 52(a), which 
provides that "[findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." A finding is clearly erroneous 
if it is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. See 
Pennington, 973 P.2d at 937. If, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's determination, a factual finding is based on sufficient evidence, the finding is 
not clearly erroneous. See Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 174 
(Utah 1996). 
Legal determinations are "those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or 
principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar 
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circumstances." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935. ff[A]ppellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness.'" Id. at 936. 
"Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." Pena, 
869 P.2d at 935. "Appellate courts have traditionally been seen as having the power and 
duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did find all the requirements needed to grant Bott's stalking 
injunction. There is ample evidence in the record to support the district court's findings 
and conclusions. Bott testified that based on Osburn's threats to shoot her, she has feared 
for the safety of herself and her children. Osburn's threats would cause emotional 
distress to any normal person, and did cause Bott's emotional distress and fear of bodily 
harm. The trial court made sufficient findings to support a determination that the 
elements of the civil stalking claim had been met. 
Dated this 15th day of November, 2010. 
Amy B. Bdtt 
Appellee, POD Se 
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